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Realism and the wave function
A. Matzkin
Department of Physics and Astronomy, University College London, Gower Street,
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Abstract. Realism – the idea that the concepts in physical theories refer to ’things’
existing in the real world – is introduced as a tool to analyze the status of the wave-
function. Although the physical entities are recognized by the existence of invariant
quantities, examples from classical and quantum physics suggest that not all the
theoretical terms refer to the entities: some terms refer to properties of the entities,
and some terms have only an epistemic function. In particular, it is argued that the
wave-function may be written in terms of classical non-referring and epistemic terms.
The implications for realist interpretations of quantum mechanics and on the teaching
of quantum physics are examined.
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1. Introduction
For Weinberg, ’wave-functions are real (...) because it is useful to include them in
our theories’ [1]. Popper on the other hand, although reluctant to argue about words,
believed something is real provided it is ’”kickable” and able to kick back if kicked’ [2].
There is a persistent confusion in the debate on the reality of quantum systems, on
what a quantum object is, and even whether there are such things as quantum objects
at all. This is not new – the debate between the ”Founding Fathers” of 20th century
physics is plagued with misunderstandings arising because of alternative or different
meanings conveyed by key words such as realism, determinism, probability, causality,
etc. It may be noted that still today, it is widely believed that the defeat of Einstein’s
position has rang the knell of realism (whereas Einstein’s realism is of a very specific
kind), or conversely that the de Broglie-Bohm version of quantum mechanics is the only
one compatible with realism (whereas history of science taken by and large indicates
that the more a theory contains ad-hoc elements unobservable in principle, the less it
refers to the real world).
Concurrently, recent investigations on the students’ understanding of quantum
mechanics have all highlighted profound conceptual problems. But depending on
the authors’ conceptions on the status of quantum physics vis-a`-vis reality, opposite
conclusions have been drawn, eg from the need to ’reconcile non-visualizable quantum
physics with visualizable classical physics’ [3] to prescription of ’avoiding reference to
classical physics’ [4].
Part of the above-mentioned problems are not so much related to what realism is
(there is of course no general agreement among philosophers on this point), but rather to
establishing clear-cut categories helpful in the analysis of quantum-mechanical reality.
Note that the very nature of the physical reality described by quantum-mechanics is
still today a matter of personal taste or of philosophical prejudice. The ontological basis
(ie, what the world is made of) underlying quantum mechanics depends on the meaning
given to the theoretical terms: are these terms real, or are they just epistemic (ie, purely
knowledge-related) tools? Our aim here is to draw some simple conceptual distinctions
concerning realism. More specifically, we will analyze the relation between quantum
mechanics and physical reality from the standpoint of reference. Present-day scientific
realism is generally based on one or other version of a theory of reference, by which
theoretical terms are assumed to refer to entities existing in the real world (Sec. 2).
This doesn’t entail however that every theoretical term refers to an existing physical
entity. We will argue in Secs. 3 and 4 that the relationship between the theoretical
terms and the physical entities is a relevant starting point to investigate the status of
the theoretical terms. We shall take examples of referring and non-referring theoretical
terms from classical mechanics, and examine the situation in quantum mechanics; in
particular, we will consider whether the wave-function can be said to be an objective
physical system, as has been recently suggested [5]. The implications of our analysis
for realist interpretations of quantum mechanics and on the students’ understanding of
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quantum phenomena will be detailed in Sec. 5.
2. Realism
As mentioned in the introduction, there is no agreement among the philosophers of
science as to what realism is. In fact, there are very different sorts of realism, and it is
not our aim here to review these (see eg [6], and [7] and references therein). Here, we will
understand by realism not so much the hypothesis that there is an autonomous external
world known as ”physical reality” (the overwhelming majority of physicists would agree
with this assumption‡) but rather the stronger idea that the concepts of physical theories
refer to ’things’ existing in the real world, ie physical theories and concepts are more
than convenient manners of organizing the data obtained from observation. Indeed,
if that were to be the case, that is if physical theories and concepts spoke of objects
that do not really exist, then, as Putnam put it, only a miracle could account for the
success of science [10]. Note that although the putative referents exist independently of
the subject, their relationship to a given theoretical term is not ascertained. Firstly, a
theoretical term doesn’t necessarily refer to a real object (which will be called hereafter
a ”physical entity”), but may refer to a property of an object, to collective properties of
an assembly of objects through model-reference, or may not refer at all (examples will
be given below). Most importantly, even referring terms are approximate and revisable
representations of physical reality. Thus, although in successive theories theoretical
terms do change, they may still refer to the same physical entity, provided the description
given by the earlier theory is reasonably modified so that the entity conserves its basic
roles and properties: a new, more accurate theory brings in novel features, but overlaps
with the previous theory on a large domain over which the older theory was known to
be accurate. The typical example is newtonian mechanics, which is still employed in
many applications though it is known to be valid only in the non-relativistic limit. This
does not mean however that the older theory is necessarily a limiting case of the novel
one; for example Franklin concludes, in his historical study [11], that neutrinos retain
to this day much of the original properties they had when Pauli originally suggested
the existence of such particles, although their currently known properties (they come
in three different varieties, and have helicities) do not make them collapse to Pauli’s
neutrinos.
A few comments are in order. Our assumptions do not entail a correspondence-
theory of truth, by which the theoretical terms would be endowed with a direct mapping
unto physical reality. As a matter of fact, the ontological perspective arising from a
theory depends on whether (and which) theoretical terms are given ontological reference.
This last point has always been discussed within the realist perspective and is intimately
related to what should be a realist account of truth§. We also see that a realistic
‡ There are some well-known exceptions however, such as Wigner [8] or Wheeler [9].
§ These discussions have over the years grown to incorporate sophisticated technical arguments (see
[12] for an introduction).
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perspective doesn’t necessarily call for a ’pictorial’ representation given in terms of
intuitive or familiar categories known to be useful in everyday life; in other words, there
is no warrant that an underlying ontology to a successful theory can be spelled out
in these categories. And it wouldn’t be surprising for such pictorial representations to
fail for ontologies concerned with scales far away from the biological realm where our
common concepts have originated.
We finally wish to make some observations on Einstein’s figure as personifying
realism. Einstein’s mature position turns out to be at odds with the previous remarks.
Probably a remnant of his early Machian heritage, Einstein starts constructing physics
from the primary sensory perceptions we experience, but insists into going beyond
this phenomenological perspective: physics is defined as a ’logical system of thought’
endowed with a uniform logical basis [13]. He is not so much concerned about
whether the theoretical terms refer, but rather about whether a theory is empirically
adequate (which according to him is the main justification of the theory). As regarding
what type of elements an acceptable theory must contain, Einstein does require the
validity of a certain number of concepts from everyday experience (causality, space-time
representation), because for him, the miracle is that the world is comprehensible, and his
main concern is for theories to give a plausible and intuitively understandable account
compatible with the available experimental data. This position was labeled by Fine
”motivational realism” [14], because its role is to give a sense to Einstein’s commitment
to science, whereas stricto sensu, the epistemological positions are closer to constructive
empiricism than to realism.
3. Physical entities and invariance
There undoubtedly are, for most physicists, real entities. Those are detected and
manipulated every day in research or development laboratories. The properties of these
physical entities are given within a physical theory – but do not entirely depend on the
theory‖. Traditionally, if not intuitively, an entity has a certain number of depictable
properties and its evolution can be followed in space and time. Some of these properties
are contextual, other are invariants. In classical (including relativistic) mechanics the
contextual (usually frame-dependent) properties are related by frame transformations;
the invariants have the same value, independently of the transformations. A property
may then unambiguously be ascribed to an entity, relative to a given reference frame, or
equivalently, the invariants under the given group of transformation may be constructed.
This is why Max Born insisted that ’the idea of invariant is the clue to a rational concept
of reality’ [16].
‖ The charge, mass or magnetic moment of the electron doesn’t change when considered within the
Bohr-Sommerfeld theory or within the wave mechanics arising from the Schro¨dinger equation. The
Dirac equation further adds a new property (spin) to the electron, which previously needed to be
incorporated in an ad-hoc manner in the non-relativistic treatment. Other properties which were
subsequently discovered, such as the electron’s role in electroweak interactions, are taken into account
by new theories which encompass both the old and the novel properties.
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This process is blurred in quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanically, an object
cannot generally be endowed with the properties it is supposed to carry (this happens
in compound systems, or for identical particles) – a situation known as the problem
of objectification. And only the time-evolution of the wave function of the physical
system in configuration space can be followed. Moreover, the wave function determines
at most mean values in conjunction with an observable, and probability amplitudes
when further associated with a definite quantized value (eigenvalue) of the observable.
Under general assumptions (without however introducing additional hidden variables)
it is not possible to attribute an individual eigenstate of an observable to the system
prior to a measurement (strong objectification) nor even an eigenvalue of an observable
to the system (weak objectification) [15] because observables do not commute and wave-
functions interfere (or put differently, because of the wave character of the particles):
there is no relation between the result of a measurement and the one that would have
been obtained from measuring another observable in a different experimental setup,
these measurements being mutually exclusive and the result of a measurement not
being known with certainty. Hence this additional dependence on the experimental
setup (that is, on the projection basis in abstract spaces) which brings in a novel type
of hyper-contextuality unknown in classical mechanics.
However, the wave-function is invariant relative to the decomposition in abstract
Hilbert space, ie a unitary frame transformation between two projection basis
corresponding to two different observables does exist. This ’invariance’ has been taken
as an argument for the objectivity of the wave-function itself – the outcome of a
measurement then appears as a contextual property of an ’objective’ physical system
[5]. Notwithstanding, it must be recognized that invariance does not entail reference.
Furthermore, realism calls for more than a symbolic transposition or representation:
hence the problem of knowing what the wave function refers to (see Sec. 4). Note
that quite independently from the wave function’s precise role, invariant quantities
are used in quantum mechanics to define the natural kinds, that is to identify the
physical entities. An electron is characterized by its mass, charge, spin, whatever the
contextual measurement (as a matter of fact, these properties are indirectly measured
from different experimental setups). The elementary particles are distinguished by a
set of invariant properties. This is also true of compound systems as a whole such as
an atom, although further variables associated with the degree of excitation appear.
It is thus clear that these invariants are properties of the physical entities that are
manipulated experimentally.
4. Theoretical terms and reference
4.1. Classical mechanics
The problem of the reference of theoretical terms seems at first sight straightforward in
classical mechanics: either the objects exist, or they don’t. A simple well-known example
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is given by the debate on the existence of the putative atoms postulated by the kinetic
theory of gases towards the end of the 19th century: were these atoms mere theoretical
tools which saved the phenomena, as the instrumentalists argued, or were they real
but at-the-time unobserved particles? A less simpler case concerns the existence of the
ether, which was postulated to exist because it was needed by the ontological picture,
although there wasn’t any compelling theoretical term which referred to it. A much
more involved example can be found in the criticism of the newtonian concept of force,
which was much criticized from its inception onwards as being obscure, while reference
to less obscure ’active principles’ was looked for. These examples illustrate the subtle
interplay between a physical theory, here classical mechanics, and the ontological basis
that goes with it, in the construction of an interpretation.
In classical mechanics, the space-time (newtonian) formulation gives rise to a simple
reference procedure: the fundamental theory gives the properties of material points i as
evolution of the position xi(t) and velocity vi(t) of those points interacting through a
function V (x1,x2, ...,v1,v2, ...). The time evolution is given by a differential equation
of the type
mi
d2xi
dt2
= −∇iV +
d
dt
∂V
∂vi
(1)
which is readily amenable to an interpretation in terms of the action of a force on the
dynamics of the material points. Larger or complex systems are investigated within
models based on the fundamental theory, involving the introduction of approximations;
we speak of model-reference. The relevant theoretical terms then refer to properties
of physical entities (usually some collective properties) through the model, which by
definition is itself an approximation. In statistical theories however, the terms do not
refer to properties of the physical entities: a statistical distribution gives informations
related to an ensemble of systems. It is an epistemic tool which at best refers to collective
properties of a finite numbers of identical systems, not to a property of an individual
system.
Now, the most powerful and elegant formulation of classical mechanics based on
the theory of canonical transformations employs theoretical terms which have a much
more abstract and complicated relation to the physical entities. An original set of
independent coordinates and momenta (qi, pi) is transformed to a new set (Qi, Pi) by
means of a generating function [17]. When all the Q’s and P ’s are chosen to be constants
of motion, the generating function is the classical action S(qi, Pi, t) obtained by solving
the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
H(qi,
∂S
∂qi
, t) +
∂S
∂t
= 0, (2)
where H is the Hamiltonian expressed in terms of the independent coordinates, and the
original momenta are retrieved by using
pi =
∂S
∂qi
. (3)
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Of course other generating functions expressed in terms of different sets of independent
coordinates may be chosen (eg the function labeled F4(pi, Pi, t) by Goldstein [17]; in this
representation, the pi’s are the independent coordinates, and the positions are retrieved
by the relation qi = −∂piF4). Theoretical emphasis is put on canonically invariant
quantities, such as the Poisson bracket of two quantities a(q, p) and b(q, p), defined by
{a, b} ≡
∑
i
∂a
∂qi
∂b
∂pi
−
∂a
∂pi
∂b
∂qi
. (4)
The effect of a transformation can then be written in terms of Poisson brackets; for
example the time evolution of a(p, q) is given by
da
dt
= {a,H}+
∂a
∂t
, (5)
where H is now expressed in terms of p and q.
What does the Poisson bracket or the classical action refer to? There is clearly
no place for them in the ontology underlying classical mechanics; these terms are
not properties of physical entities. Relative to the ontology of classical mechanics,
they are epistemic terms from which we can extract the dynamics of the system (the
action – a non-local quantity – gives all the possible trajectories compatible with
the mechanical system, the bracket gives the evolution generated by an infinitesimal
canonical transformation). The propagation of the action in configuration space can be
studied for its own sake (for example the surface of constant S forms a wave-front normal
to the trajectories propagating with velocity E/p). But this doesn’t make the action a
referring term, although we know how to associate this term with the trajectories of
physical entities.
4.2. Quantum mechanics
The main problem in understanding quantum mechanics is centered on the meaning of
the wave function. Ontological interpretations hinge on the task of referring the wave-
function to some recognizable physical phenomenon, and there is clearly no agreement on
this point. Schro¨dinger’s original position, abandoned soon afterwards, was to envision
the wave function as existing in real space. The well-known ’many worlds interpretation’
is a consistent manner of taking the wave function at face-value. A more elaborate form
of combining projective decompositions of the wave-function evolution is achieved by
the consistent histories interpretation; however, the ontological status of the histories
(each one of them is consistent, but two histories are generally incompatible accounts
of the same phenomena) is open to question. In the de Broglie-Bohm account of
quantum mechanics, the wave function is referred to a real physical field existing in
configuration space; this space therefore acquires an ontological existence. More recently,
the introduction of non-destructive measurements has lead certain authors [18] to ascribe
to the wave function the role of referring to a time-averaged property of a particle.
To tackle the problem of the reference of the wave function, let us start by
recalling that there are three well-established connections between quantum and classical
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theoretical terms¶. First, there is the formal correspondence between a classical Poisson
bracket and the quantum-mechanical commutator, a procedure known as canonical
quantization. For example the classical relation {qi, pj} = δij has the quantum
counterpart (ih¯)−1 [qˆi, pˆj] = δij , where the hat denotes an operator, and Eq. (5) has
the counterpart
daˆ
dt
=
1
ih¯
[
aˆ, Hˆ
]
+
∂aˆ
∂t
, (6)
that is the evolution of a quantum-mechanical operator aˆ(t) in the Heisenberg picture.
Second, the path-integral approach gives the transition amplitude of the evolution
operator in the time-interval tf − t0 as
〈qf , tf |q0, t0〉 =
∫
D(q) exp
[
i
∫ tf
t0
dtL(q, q˙)/h¯
]
(7)
where the integral of the Lagrangian L is of course S(qf , tf ; q0, t0), the classical action.
Finally, the so-called WKB theory gives the semiclassical approximation of the wave
function as
ψ(qf , tf ) = A(q0, t0)
∣∣∣∣∣det
∂q0
∂qf
∣∣∣∣∣
1/2
exp [iS(qf , tf ; q0, t0)/h¯− µπ/2] ; (8)
A2 represents the classical probability density and µ is the Maslov index keeping track
of the caustics (the points in phase-space where the semiclassical approximation is not
valid) along the trajectory.
Note that in order to obtain Eqs. (7) and (8) assumptions which are seldom
mentioned and which are not compelling within quantum mechanics must be made.
In Eq. (7), although the different variables qk that appear in the measure D(q) are
independent variables of integration, the classical action is obtained only by forcefully
identifying qk+1 − qk with q˙kdt [19]. In an analog manner S is only one of the infinite
number of phases yielding the semiclassical wave function (8) (quantum mechanics only
imposes that all these phases obey a nonlinear equation [20], provided the amplitude
A changes accordingly). These stronger assumptions must be made if any connection
between quantum mechanical and classical are to be made at all. These assumptions
are known to be consistent; for example in many systems for which h¯ can be scaled,
preferential propagation of the wave function along classical periodic trajectories has
been observed as h¯ → 0, a finding which has sparked progress in many branches of
semiclassical physics [21].
What is striking is that the quantum-mechanical relations are made-up with
quantities that classically have an epistemic non-referring interpretation+. The
operators alone are not sufficient to obtain the dynamics; they must be associated
¶ We leave aside the phase-space formulation of quantum mechanics of the Weyl-Wigner-Moyal type,
where the connection between quantum and classical terms is more complex.
+ There is of course no warrant that the same interpretation needs to hold within quantum mechanics.
In fact, there are historical examples and counterexamples: Ptolemy’s epicycles and cristalline spheres
never came to refer to anything, whereas the energy, which was regarded as an abstract mathematical
tool, became a central referring property by the end of the 19th century.
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with a wave function to obtain eigenvalues or mean values. The wave function is
generally obtained from the eigenfunctions of the Hamiltonian, and in any case depends
on the interactions between the particles: for example the wave function of, say an
electron in a magnetic field is quite different from the wave function of an electron
in a Coulomb field, although in both cases the wave function is related to the same
physical entity that has the same invariant properties. The fact that the wave function
conveys different dynamical information while supposedly referring to the same object is
again in favour of an epistemic interpretation. The wave-function invariance (in Hilbert
space) argument mentioned in Sec. 3, according to which the objectivity of the wave
function is increased by this invariance, was seen to have its counterpart in classical
mechanics, where different representations for the abstract and non-referring generating
functions can be chosen. Other arguments which render difficult the task of referring
the wave function include the unchallenged probability postulate and thus the need for a
normalization factor, the irrelevance of a global phase in the wave function and the non-
invariance under Galilean transformations of the local wavelength of the wave function.
The most problematic point, however, remains the reduction of the wave function during
a measurement process. It seems unlikely that any decisive progress on the meaning of
the wave function will be made before a satisfying solution to the measurement problem
will be found.
5. Implications
We have argued that within a realist perspective, it is not compelling to refer the wave
function to a physical entity, since not all theoretical terms refer to physical entities or
their properties. We examine the implications on the interpretation and the teaching of
quantum mechanics.
5.1. Interpretation
Whereas empiricists and instrumentalists consider quantum mechanics as a masterpiece
to validate their arguments, realist interpretations have been obscured by two points.
First, a certain number of preconceived epistemological constraints that were imposed
as basic requirements in any realistic account (an example is Einstein’s position, as
sketched in Sec. 2); for example it is often thought that realism imposes an isomorphism
between the theoretical terms and nature (eg, objectivity, understood in the precise
sense of relating a theoretical term with an element of reality with unit probability –
as it appeared in the EPR paper [22] – is believed to be a basic prerequisite for any
theory compatible with realism). The upshot is that these epistemological constraints
aim at bypassing any epistemic barrier between our theories and reality, thus implicitly
assuming a pre-structured reality and a correspondance theory of truth.
The second point concerns a preconceived ontology; a realist account is often
thought to be necessarily spelled out in apparently familiar terms, although there is a
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price to pay because the ontology must be modified to account for the novel phenomena.
A demonstrative example is the de Broglie-Bohm approach to quantum mechanics [23]:
a wave – a real physical field propagating in configuration space – guides the particles
along in principle unobservable trajectories. Originally devised to restore a continuity
between classical descriptions and quantum phenomena – it was later claimed that
it would avoid ’arbitrary dichotomies ... between evident (macroscopic) realism and
quantum (microscopic) nonrealism’ [24] –, Bohmian mechanics has been led to ascribe
to the putative entities a haul of counterintuitive properties: particles are detected
even though no trajectories go nearby the detector, properties such as the mass of the
particles are delocalized, configuration space has sometimes been claimed to be more
fundamental than our 3+1 D space-time, classical trajectories are seldom obtained in
the classical limit. Such peculiarities are given ad-hoc assumptions if necessary so
as to yield the standard or experimental results. In view of this situation, it might
appear as a paradox for Bohmian mechanics to be coined the interpretation of quantum-
mechanics compatible with realism, even sometimes as the main counter-argument used
by many realist philosophers with an interest in the interpretation of quantum mechanics
[25, 26]∗.
The consistent histories approach [27] offers a quite different perspective regarding
the interplay between epistemological and ontological constraints. From our point of
view, the main feature comes from the existence of alternative and mutually exclusive
consistent histories. For example in a beam-splitter (this example is discussed in [28]),
the neutron, at some intermediate time t1 before being detected, is in either of the two
channels if it is described by two different histories of a certain family; a history belonging
to another family states that at t1 the wave-function is in a superposition state. What
can be the ontological value of this ”many-picture” formalism? Each history taken
individually makes sense from an epistemic standpoint (and the history thereby allows
us to intuit the physical evolution of the system in-between observations), but any of
the alternative and complimentary pictures may be taken as valid. The properties of the
physical phenomena is thus context-dependent through the history that is chosen for the
description, and in this respect, the consistent histories interpretation does not shed new
light on the properties and objectification problems briefly mentioned in Sec. 3. Maybe
our brains lack the categories in which reference could be expressed (we would then be in
presence of an internal biological epistemic barrier), and the problem of objectification
can therefore be dismissed: there are real physical entities, but as far as we can know,
their properties can only be described relative to a given history (compatible with a
given experimental setup). However, we noted there are invariant, context-independent
properties, and we suggested that the wave-function was ”made-up” of classically non-
referring terms. Moreover an actual measurement performed at an intermediate time
yields a unique result, and we know that a unique classical macroscopic description arises
from the diverse quantum histories. This is why, in our view, the task of constructing an
∗ This forms part of a more general tendency some philosophers have which is to use any interpretation
giving the wave-function an ontological existence as an argument for realism.
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ontological picture from the physical theory hinges on the resolution of the measurement
problem – the quantum-mechanical description of classical phenomena♯.
We have seen that realism doesn’t entail a correspondence theory of truth by which
every element of reality could be mapped onto theoretical terms. Moreover, realism
is not concerned by adapting a physical theory to a preconceived ontological basis: as
celebrated examples in the history and philosophy of science have taught us, this can
only be done by developing a plethora of ad-hoc hypothesis, increasingly non-referring
and unphysical. If, as we have argued, realism is based on referring theoretical terms
to physical entities, there is no place for in principle unobservable properties, because
observation is the warrant of referentiability, ie it is only by repeating and combining
observations that the referents can be accessed [30]. Although we know how to recognize
real physical entities, through their invariant properties, it is not clear what the furniture
of the quantum world is.
5.2. Teaching
If, following Feynman, nobody does understand quantum theory (for a more nuanced
review of the present situation, see [31]), particular difficulties in the teaching of quantum
physics are to be expected. Indeed, recent investigations in the students’ understanding
of quantum phenomena have not surprisingly diagnosed profound conceptual difficulties
[3, 4, 32]. More surprisingly however, opposite conclusions have been drawn from
these studies: in one case [4] it is recommended to avoid any reference to classical
physics and to dual quantum/classical descriptions, such as the Bohr atom, in favour
of statistical interpretations of observed phenomena. In another case [3], it was found
that the difficulties arise from the ontological and epistemological status that students
ascribe to the theoretical terms, and it was suggested to develop ’mental models’ that
would reconcile quantum and classical physics. More generally the findings indicate
conceptual difficulties that later persist when more advanced material is studied; only
specific tutorials based on constructing concepts and ’relating the formalism of physics
to the real-world phenomena’ [32] were found to be efficient.
If conceptual problems deserve conceptual treatments, it then appears that the
specific problems raised by quantum mechanics can hardly be understood without going
into a more general inquiry on the relationship between theories and reality. We have
argued that an approach from the realist standpoint of reference is well-suited in order
to understand this relationship. Globally, this suggests that introductory courses to the
philosophy of science would help the students in their confrontations with the inevitable
conceptual problems that arise when trying to understand what is quantum mechanics
and what is quantum reality [33].
♯ There have been claims (eg [27]), that at least for practical purposes, the existence of classical
properties is well understood, but there is no agreement even within the consistent histories perspective
[29].
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6. Conclusion
Realism leads us to believe that physical theories refer to real physical entities.
This doesn’t mean that every theoretical term must refer. We have given examples
of theoretical terms that have an epistemic non-referring signification in classical
mechanics. We have further seen that quantum-mechanical theoretical terms can
be constructed with these classical epistemic terms. The tension between the
invariant properties of the physical entities and the contextual nature of the wave
function suggests that a realist interpretation will come through with the solution to
the measurement problem, rather than by imposing preconceived epistemological or
ontological constraints.
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